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ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION
AND THE "DOUBLE DIVIDEND:"
A READER'S UWDE
ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been great interest in the possibility of substituting
environmentally motivated or "green" taxes for ordinazy income taxes. Some have suggested that
such revenue-neutral reforms might offer a "double dividend:" not only (1) improve the
environment but also (2) reduce certain costs of the tax system. This paper articulates different
notions of "double dividend" and examines the theoretical and empirical evidence for each. In
addition it draws connections between the double dividend issue and principles of optimal
environmental taxation in a second-best setting.
A weak double dividend claim is that returning tax revenues through cuts in distortionary
taxes leads to cost savings relative to the case where revenues are returned lump sum. This claim
is easily defended on theoretical grounds and (thankfully) receives wide support from numerical
simulations. The stronger versions contend that revenue-neutral swaps of environmental taxes
for ordinary distortionary taxes involve zero or negative gross costs. Theoretical analyses and
numerical results tend to cast doubt on the strong double dividend claim. At the same time, the
theoretical case against the strong form is not air-tight, and the numerical evidence is mixed.
In simple models, the conditions under which the strong double dividend claim is rejected
(upheld) are closely related to the conditions under which the second-best optimal environmental
tax is less than (greater than) the marginal environmental damages.
The difficuhy of establishing the strong double dividend claim heightens the importance






Economistshave long favored the use of taxes as instruments of environmental protection. To
many economic analysts, in situations involving serious externalities taxes axe the most effective
mechanism for 'getting the prices light" --thatis. for helping prices closely approximate marginal social
costs. The notion that taxes can improve welfaxe outcomes by internalizing externalities traces back at
least as far as Pigou (1938) and is a central tenet of environmental economics.
Real-world economies obtain public revenues rot only through environmental (corrective) taxes
but also through distortionary taxes such as income, payroll, and sales taxes. What constitutes getting the
prices right (or merely closer to right) is more complicated in a second-best setting where both types of
taxes are present than in a world with environmental taxes alone. This is the case for at least two reasons,
First, taxes interact. In particular, the gross'costsof newly imposed environmental taxes are regulated
by pm-existing distortionary taxes! Second, the presence of other taxes introduces the possibility of
"swapping" an envirunmental tax for an existing tax. Consider a tax reform in which an environmental
tax is introduced and its revenues are used to finance reductions in the income tax. The overall gross cost
of this revenue-neutral package depends not only on the (gross) costs of the environmental tax itself but
also on the efficiency benefits (avoided efficiency costs) associated with the reduction in income tax
rates?
These issues have come to life in recent analyses and policy debases surrounding the carbon tax
'I emphasize "gross" to make clear that the discussion here concerns only the cost (or non-environmental) side of
the ledger. Clearly environmental taxes generally yield both benefits (from imroved environmental quality) and costs
(or abatement costs). Overall efficiency reflects both sides of the ledger, that is. net benefits The present discussion
focuses on the cost side. Later on, the paper will connect this discussion to considerations of environmental benefits,
'Partial equilibrium analysissuggeststhat the incremental gross efficiency cost of a new tax in a given market is
higher, thelargerare pre-existingtaxesin that market. This follows from the basic notion in public economics that the
costs of a given tax tend to rise with the square of the overalltaxrate. However, as emphasized later in this paper, tax
interactions extend across markets: pre-existing taxes in other markets significantly affect the costs of a new tax in a
given market.
This idea was advanced several decades ago by Tullock (1961) and Kneese and Bower (196S), and somewhat more
recently by Nichols (1984). Terkla (1984) appears to have been the ftrst to perform a numerical assessmentof the
efficiency benefits associated with devoting environmental tax revenues to cuts in existing taxes,option. Initial work on carbon taxes tended to ignore other distortionary taxes. In most of the initial
studies it was assumed that the revenues 1mm this tax would be returned to the economy in a lump-sum
fashion.4 Subsequent analyses pointed out, however, that the revenues could be used to finance reductions
in ordinary, distortionary taxes. Several analysts have indicated that this could significantly reduce the
costs6 of the carbon tax. indeed, somehavesuggested that these costs could be zero or negative when
opportunities to "recycle" the revenues through cuts in distortionary taxes are taken into account.
However, some recent theoretical and empiuical work points out an effect that works in the opposite
direction, revealing ways that existing distortionary taxes may interact with the carbon tax and thereby
enlarge the carbon tax's costs. While recognizing that recycling the revenues can reduce the costs of a
carbon tax, this work shows that for any given method of recycling, pie-existing taxes augment the costs.
Much of this work indicates that this tax interaction effect is larger than the revenue-recycling effect, so
that, overall, a revenue-neutral carbon tax is likely toinvolve positive costs in a second-best setting.
The term "double dividend" relates directly to these discussions. Pearce (1991) noted that swam
of environmental taxes for distortionary taxes may produce a double dividend by not only (I) discouraging
environmentally damaging activities but also (2) reducing the distortionary cost of the tax system. l'he
double dividend concept is relevant to many important ideas 'in second-best environmental taxation,
Unfortunately, the term is used in different ways: the dividend represented by (2) above, in particular.
can have very different interpretations. This has led to some confusion. TIlls paper will distinguish the
different notions of "double dividend" and analyze the theoretical and empitical support for each, The
main motivation here is not to develop a taxonomy but rather to clarify key issues relevant to the
For example, in its Model Comparison Project undertaken in 1990-2, the OECD commissioned six models to
investigate the costs of reducing CO, emissions thxtugh carbon taxes. In this investigation, costs were evaluated
assuming lump-ruin replacement of revenues. Only two of the six models were capable of assuming alternative forms
of revenue-replacement. On this see OECD (1992),
'For general discussions, see, for example. Pearce (1991), Poterba (1991),Oates(1991), Pezzey (1992). and Repetto
eta!. (1992). For numerical assessments, see Shackleton ci al. (1992) and Gains and Weyant (1994) for results from
several models; see also Section IV's references to the models discussed in that section.
6For the rest of this paper, "costs" refers to the gross costs (that is, abstracting from environmental benefits) unless
otherwiseindicated.
2formulation of environmental policy in second-best economies. The discussion is intended to help
delineatethe circumstancesunderwhichthe substitutionof 'green or environmentally motivated taxes
for typical existing taxes is likelyto be an efficiency-improving venture.
Beforelaunching intothespecifics of the double dividend issue, it may be useful to view this
issueina broader context Thereiswidespread agreement as to theabilityof environmental taxes to
confer thefirst dividend above(environmental improvement), althoughthe magnitude of this dividend
usually is highlyuncertain. Onthe other hand, thereismuch debateas to what kindof additional
(second) dividend, if any,mightbe offered by environmental taxes. The preoccupationwiththe possibility
of a second dividend, in my view, reflects the uncertaintiesaboutthe magniwdesofthe first,Muéhof
the debate about the second dividend is in termsofwhetherenvironmentaltaxes canbeintroduced in a
way that is costless. The no-cost idea ishighly attractiveto policymakerswho axeinterested in "green
taxswap" butarefrustratedbytheuncertainties as tothe values oftheenvironmentalbenefits thatwould
result from suchswaps. Under theseconditions,theno-costideais especiallyappealing.If revenue-
neutralenvironmental tax policies are costless, then the burden of proof facing the policymaker is much
reduced: tojustifythe environmentaltax on benefit-cost grounds,itsufficestoknow the sign of the
environmentalbenefits --toknow that they are positive. If costs are zero (or negative). this guarantees
positive net benefits. On the other hand, if one cannot be assured that the costs are zero, then before one
can recommend an environmental tax swap on efficiency grounds one has to be involved in the messy
businessof comparing (uncertain)environmental benefits with abatement costs.
Thus the debate about the double dividend reflects the desire to be able to make safe judgments
about environmental reforms in the presence of uncertainty. In my view, it makes a difference how this
debate is resolved, because this could influence what policyinakers view as the minimal information
requirements for fruitful environmental tax reform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II distinguishes three interpretations of the
double dividend conceptand comments on the implicationsof each. The stronger interpretations are most
relevant to policy evaluation, and subsequent sections of the paper deal primarily with them. Section LII
examines the theoretical evidence for or against the stronger double dividend notions. Section IV presents
3numerical results. Section V discusses the relationship between this issue and optimal environmental
taxation. The flnal section often conclusions.
II. Three DoubleDividend Propositions
Onecan distinguish several double-dividend claims that might be made about a given
environmental tax initiative such as a carbon tax. Here are three:'
Weak Form: By using revenues from the environmental tax to finance reductions in marginal
rates of an existing disrortionary tax, one achieves cost savings relative to the case where the tax
revenues are returned to taxpayers in lump-sum fashion.
ImermediateForm: Itis possible to find a distorlionary tax such that the revenue-neutral
substitution of the environmental tax for this tax involves a zero or negative gross cost.
Strong Form: The revenue-neutral substitution of the environmental tax for typical or
representative distortionary taxes involves a zero or negative gross cost.
A. The Weak Form
These hypotheses differ in terms of what they propose about the costs of revenue-neutral
environmental tax policies. Let "gross cost" refer to the cost. of a given tax initiative, abstracting from
whatever environmental benefits apply. Let CflE ATO derxte the gross cost of the new environmental
tax t accompanied by lump-sum tax reductions ATL sufficient to make the policy revenue-neutral.
Similarly, let C(t, at) denote the gross cost of the new tax t1 accompanied by cuts in the distortionary
tax At sufficient to achieve revenue-neutrality. The first proposition asserts that:
CUE. at,) <C(te.AT3. (I)
'Other notions have appewed. In European discussions, reduced unemployment and increased profits an often
referred to as the potential extra dividends (in addition to improved environmental quality) from environmental taxes.
See, for example. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1993a). Carraro, Galeotti, and Gallo (1994). and Nielsen. Pedersen,
and Sorensen (1994).Inthis papa,the extra dividend ismore fundamental: it relates togrosswelfarecostsrather than
specific economic variables (such as etnploynient or profits) that contributeto welfare.
4The gross cost is tower when revenues are replaced through cuts in the distoitionacy tax than when
revenues are replaced lump-sum. Under this proposition. the 'second dividend is the tower distortionary
cost in the Ionner case (left-hand side) relative to the cost in the latter case (right-hand side).
The weak double dividend notion is relatively uncontroversial. This is fortunate, because the key
assumption on which it depends is relatively innocuous. The weak double dividend claim can be shown
to be equivalent to the cLaim that replacing, at the margin, a lump-sum tax for a distortionary tax entails
a positive welfare cost (apart from environmental considerations).' This tatter claim is not difficult to
uphold, since the idea that swapping a distortionary tax for a lump-sum tax has a positive welfare cost is
part of the usual definition of "distortionary." So long as the tax t, deserves its title as a distortionary tax,
it will have a positive efficiency cost and the weak double-dividend claim will hold,
One important clarification is in order here. Consider the case where t] is negative in the status
quo ante. Starting from a negative value (or subsidy), a further reduction in this tax (financed through
lump-sum taxes) may be efficiency-worsening. Under these circumstances, if a new environmental tax
is employed to finance reductions in a "distortionary' tax whose value is already negative, the weak
double-dividend will not obtain. This does not contradict the claim from the previous paragraph. In the
situation described here, the key requirement of the weak double-dividend notion -- that the tax t, have
a positive marginal excess burden -- is missing.
The weak form can related to the elements of Figure 1. The figure often the typical partial
equilibrium and first-best framework for analyzing welfare effects of an environmental tax.' MC denotes
the private marginal costs of producing the given commodity, which in this example is coal.
'This can be shown as follows. Consider the two post-reform situations associated with (I). One (associated with
theleft-hand side)involves a reduction in a distortionary tax the other (associated with the rigjn-hand side) involves
a lump-sum tax reduction. Thetwo post-reformsituationsare alikein other important respects: they involve thesame
tax revenue and all other tax razes (incLuding kj are the sane. One can wiite the levels of welfare associated with the
two post-reform situations as W(t, ta', T3 and W(t5,t,,T3 where t,' = t, + At and 'FL' = 'FL + 6'FL (Note that
at<O. AT1<O.) The weak doubLe dividend assertion is equivalent to the assenion that W(t5, t2', T3 > W(t5. t,, 'L)'
This, however, is equivalent to the assertion that the gross efficiency cost of raising the distortionary tax from t' to t,.
where the change is financed through a reduction in lump-sum taxes from TL to It'. is positive. Thus, the weak double
dividend claim is upheld so long as the distortionary tax considered has a positive gross efficiency cost or excess burden.
'In this example, the tax is a strict Pigovian tax in that it applies to a commodity with which pollution is associated
rather than directly to pollution emissions. The basic lessons apply to emissions taxes as well.
5represents the social marginalcost curve, incorporatingthemarginalexternaldamage(marginalexternal
cost). MED. MB represents the marginal benefit (demand) curve. If a tax is imposed on coal equal to
the marginal external damage, social and private marginal costs become aligned. The usual textbook
analysis regards the welfaregain asarea B.'° This is the value of the environmental improvement (A+B)
minusthegross efficiencycosts of the tax(A).
This simpleanalysis suggests thatthe taxrevenue R is transferredcostlesslyfrom thosewho pay
thecoal tax to the government and back to the private sector",withno efficiency consequences. The
weaknotion of the doubledividend recognizesthe fact that this "recycling' of the revenues(R)may
indeed have efficiency consequences. The assertion is that when revenues axe used to cut existing
distortionary taxes, in particular, they help reduce the overall (gross) distortionary costs of the tax system.
If the gross costs under lump-sumreplacementare given by area A, then under distortionary-tax
replacementthey are less than A.'2
It is important to recognize, however, that other important cost considerations may be obscured
by the first-best, partial equilibrium framework embodied in Figure 1. In particular, when other taxes
(such as income taxes) are present, the area A in Figure 1 is not a good indicator of the gross costs of the
tax on coal. The weak double dividend noUon correctly claims that rebating revenues through cuts in
distortionaiy taxes reduces gross costs relative to their level under lump-sum replacement, but the
reference level from which the reduction occurs is generally quite different from that suggested by area
A in the diagram. We return to this issue below,
B. The Stronger Forms
The intermediate and strong double-dividend notions involve assertions about the sign of the gross
"In the case with non-constant private marginal costs or non-constant marginal external costs, the presentation is
slightly more complicated, but the results are essentially the same.
"In the simplest case, the revenues axe returned to the private sector in a lump-sum fashion.
2Of course, the government couid waste the revaues — for example, by applying them to government projects with
benefit-cost ratios below one. In this case the gross costs will be greaser than A. In this paper! do not consider which
use of revenues is most likely; I leave that to political scientists.
6cost of a revenue-neutral policy in which an environmental tax replaces (some of) an existing distortionary
tax. The assertion is:
C(k. t) c 0. (2)
The assertion here is that swappinganenvironmental tax for a distothonary tax involves a negative gross
cost overall.
The intermediate and strong double dividend notions differ in the strength of the claim as to the
extensiveness of the class of distortionary taxes for which (2) holds. The intermediate notion affirms that
there exists at least one distortionaiy tax Lx for which (2) applies; the strong notion claims that (2) holds
for typical or representative existing taxes. For any given distortionary tax (tx) involved in the tax swap.
condition (2) is stronger than (I) assuming C(k. LST3 > 0.
One can decompose the overall gross cost C(k. at) into that which is"directly attributable" to
the environmental tax and that which is "directly attributable" to the reduction in the distoxtionary tax,'
The intermediate and strong double dividend notions can be interpreted as claims that the first cost -- the
cost resulting from to the environmental tax -- is smaller in absolute magnitude than the second cost --
the cost associated with the cut in the distortionary tax. In other words, when the taxes axe scaled to
imply the same revenue impact, the environmental tax introduces a smaller cost than an equal-revenue
change in the distortionary tax.
It is important to be clear about what is meant by "costs." In conditions (1) and (2). costs (C) are
the monetary equivalents to the policy-induced changes in individual welfare (abstracting from welfare
effects associated with policy-related changes in environmental quality). In the relaxed theoretical work.
welfare depends directly on individual consumption of goods and services and enjoyment of leisure. It
should be recognized that, measured this way, economic cost can differ in sign and magnitude from
changes in other important macroeconomic variables such as GNP or the growth of GNP. The question
'Since taxes intaact, the attribution of the cost of the revenue-neuual policy change into "direct" effects oft8 and
"direct" effects of &, is not automatic. A reasonable decomposition is to split CU8, At,) into CU8, AT11) and C(At,
ATU). where AT1 and AT are the lump-sum tax changes necessary to make the component changes k and At revenue-
neutral.
7whether a given revenue-neutral tax swap entails positive costs is different from the question whether the
swap entails a reduction in GNP or its growthrate!4
Relative to the strong version. the intermediate double-dividend version makes a more modest
claim about the circumstances in which gross costs will be zero or negative. It asserts the existence of
at least one particularly burdensome distortionaiy tax whose replacement by an environmental taxes would
involve negative costs. It should be noted that the case for removing or reducing an unusually costly
existing tax can be made without introducing environmental considerations. Even without bringing in the
environmental dimension, there would be strong reasons for replacing this tax with other taxes on narrow
(non-environmental) efficiency gmunds.LS Correspondingly, although the presence of this highly
inefficient tax may supply a target for general tax reform, by itself it does not offer support for introducing
the new environmental tax.
As mentioned in the introduction, the validity of the strong form of the double dividend would
significantly reduce information hurdles associated with the evaluation of environmental taxes. If the
strong double-dividend obtained, policymakers would not need to establish magnitudes of environmental
benefits to justify the tax swap on overall benefit-cost grounds. Instead, it would only be necessary to
confirm that environmental benefits axe positive. In light of the substantial uncertainties surrounding the
magnitudes of environmental benefits from green taxes, the appeal of the suong form is quite
understandable. Much of the debate about the potential for environmental tax reform revolves around
whether the strong form holds. The remainder of this paper gives particular attention to this double-
dividend notion.
GNP is an imperfect indicator of gross welfare for several reasons. One is that it only reflects the marginal welfare
conuib'utions of goods and serwces (to the extent that these are reflected in market prices); infrainarginal surpluses are
not incorporated. A second reason is that it disregard welfare contributions from non-marketed goods and services such
as leisure.
'If efficiency were the only consideration, optimal Lax reform would achieve equality in the marginal efficiency
costs of all taxes with non-zero rates. Of course, efficiency is not the sole policy objeciiv& A highly inefficient tax
may be worth keeping if it has important virtues along other dimensions such as distribuiioa
8III. Does the Strong Form Hold?Theoretical Considerations
A.A Key Result
This section examines the theoretical evidence related to the strong interpretation of the double
dividend idea. An important theoretical investigation of this issue was provided by Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1992, 1993). These authors develop a simple general equilibrium model with one primary factor
of production --labor--andthree produced commodities --a"clean" consumption good, a "dirty"
consumption good, and a public good (nonrival in consumption). Production exhibits constant returns to
scale, and the rates of transformation between the three produced commodities ace constant and equal to
unity. Environmental quality is negatively related to aggregate production of the duty consumption good.
A representative household derives utility from leisure, from consumptioti of the three produced goods,
and from environmental quality. The two private goods and leisure are weakly separable from the public
good and environmental quality in the utility function.
Bovenberg and de Mooij begin with the situation where the only tax is a labor income tax with
a constant marginal tax rate. They then consider the effects of a revenue-neutral policy change in which
a tax is imposed on the dirty consumption commodity and the revenues ale devoted to a reduction in the
labor tax rate. The commodity tax is non-infinitesimalt6. The strong double dividend claim is that this
policy would yield an increase in non-environment-related welfare, that is, in the uUlity hum the
composite of consumption and leisure enjoyed by the representative household.'7 These authors find that
this claim is substantiated if and only if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is negative.
that is. if and only if the labor supply function is backward-bending. Most empirical studies of labor
supply yield positive values for the uncompensated elasticity"; thus, the Bovenberg-de Mooij resultstend
"Alternatively, the tax is incremental but superimposed on an existing non-infinitesimal tax on the dirty consumption
commodity. The significance of the 'non-infinitesimal" assumption is discussed in Section V.
"The separability assumption enables the authors to evaluate utility from the consumptiOn-leisure composite apart
from the utility from public goods or environmental quality.
"See. for example, l{ausman (1985).
9to reject the double dividend proposition in its strong form.'9
What lies behind the Bovenberg-de Mooij result? There are two key components. First, the tax
on the environmentally harmful consumption good lowers the after-tax wage and generates distortions in
the labor market, and these labor market distortions axe at least as great in magnitude as the labor market
distortions from a labor tax increment of equal revenue yield. Hence, the revenue-neutral swap in which
the environmental tax replaces (some ot) the labor tax leads to no reduction (and usually an increase) in
labor market distortions. Second. the tax on the environmentally damaging commodity induces changes
in the commodity market -- "distorting" the choice among alternative commodities.2° These two
distortionary effects -- in labor and commoditymarkets-- imply that, apart from environmental
considerations, the revenue-neutral combination of an environmental tax and reduction in labor tax
involves a reduction in the non-environmental component of welfare. In fact, the distortions in the
commodity and labor markets are connected. To the extent that the environmentally motivated commodity
tax leads households to substitute other commodities for the taxed commodity, there is a reduction in the
gross revenue yield of the tax. This tax base erosioneffect limitsthe extent to which the environmental
tax can finance a reduction in the labor tax, and augments the overall gross cost of the tax initiative.
The intuition for this result is as follows.2'Consider a static model in which there is one labor
market (no labor heterogeneity). Let Case 1 refer to the situation where there is just one produced
commodity. Suppose that initially there is a tax on labor but no commodity tax. Under these
circumstances the commodity tax (even an infmitesmal one) produces a non-infinitesimal excess burden.
This occurs because, under the circumstances just described, the introduction of a commodity tax is
formally identical to an increase in the labor tax. It reduces the real wage in precisely the same way an
'9At the same time, Bovenberg and de Mooij's analysis supports the weak notion of double dividend, Their paper
concludes with 'Hence, there exists a 'double dividend' in the sense that a cost reduction can be achieved by using
revenues from pollution taxes to cut distationary taxes rather than returning these revenues in a lump-sum fashion?
29t should be kept in mind that we are concerned with "distortionC in the gross sense — absflcting from
environmental considerations. Clearly environmental taxes can improve overall resource allocation -- reduce overall
distortions .- when the environmental dimensions is considered. We return to Ibis issue below.
'See Poterba (1993) for a complementary discussion.
10increase in a labor tax would.2 Now suppose. in contrasttothis first case, that therearemany distinct
produced commodities. As before, suppose that the initial situation involves only a tax on labor. Now
consider (Case 2) the effect of introducing a uniform but small tax on allcommodities,and (Case 3) the
effect of introducing a small tax on just oneofthe commodities. Case 2 is formally similar to Case I;
it will generate non-infinitesimal excess burdens because this tax is equivalent to an increase in the wage
tax?3 Case 3 is relevant to the imposition of an environmental tax on one commodity. Bovenberg and
de Mooij show analytically that, for a given revenue yield, the excess burden in Case 3 is non-
infinitesimal and in fact is larger than in Case 1 or 2. The reason is that Case 3generatesthe same or
largerlabor marketdistortion as in the other cases and a larger distortion in the commodity maiteLs?
A fundamental lesson from Bovenberg and deMooij's analysisisthatpartial equilibrium analyses
of the gross costs of environmental taxes can be highly misleading. They show that environmental taxes
importantly affect resource use in markets other than the market in which the tax is applied --with
significant implications for gross costs. These general equilibrium impacts are especially important if them
are prior taxes in other' markets such as the labor market.25
These results indicate that there are twoimportantomissions in Figure 1. They work in opposite
The after-tax real wage is (I) the after-tax nominal wage divided by (2) the &oss of tax price of consumption.
Income taxes directly affect the after-tax real wage by reducing (1), whereas energy taxes directly influence this wage
by raising (2).
'2A uniform commodity tax does not avoid distorting the commodity market in all circumstances. A sufficient set
ol conditions for its optimality is that commodity consumption be separable from leisure in utility and that the utility
function be homothetic. See Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993).
'The gross cost is greater in Case 3 than in Case 2 under the stated assumption that the environmental tax is non-
infmitesimal. With an infinitesimal environmental tax, the commodity market gross distortion is negligible, and the net
distortionary impact in the labor market is zero (the effect of the new environmental tax just compensates for the effect
of the reduction in the labor tax). With the large" environmental tax. in COnUtSL the commodity market distortion is
non-incremental. So long as there is some substitutability across commodifl, the tax on the environmental commodity
leads tO substitution away from this commodity in consumption. This implies a loss of tax base (relative to the case
of no substitution) and, importantly, a reduction in the absolute magnitude of the cut in labor taxes which can be
financed by the environmental tax. Because of this tax base erosion effect, the enviromnaital tax is unable to finance
a reduction in labor taxes large enough to compensate for the implicit increase in labor taxes represented by the
environmental tax itself. Thus, when environmental taxes are "large, the revenue-neutral combination of environmental
tax and labor tax cut involves a gross distortionary cost for two reasons: (1) labor market distortions are enlarged, and
(2) a non-negligible distortion is generated in the commodity market.
On the other hand, the partial equilibrium weLfare analysis is apt for a first-best world with no prior taxes.
11directions. First(asemphasized by the weak double dividend claim), the revenues R can be used to
reduce grossdistortionarycosts.This suggests thatthepartialequilibrium analysiswouldoverstate the
cost ofthe environmentaltax initiative. At thesame time, the presence of other (labor) taxes implies that,
for any given use of the tax revenues, the gross distortion from the environmental tax will be larger than
implied by Figure 1. Thisimpliesthe opposite bias horn the partial equilibrium analysis. Bovenberg and
de Mooij show that the latter effect is larger in magnitude than the former overall, thepresence of prior
taxes implies higher gross costs from the environmental tax -- even when revenues are recycled through
cuts in the distoriionary tax. These two effects are schematized in Figure 2. Adopting terminology similar
to thatintroducedby Parry (1994) in a recent paper, I call the former effect the revenue-recycling effect
and the latter the tax-i nteraeaon effect.tm (The tax base erosion effect, mentioned three paragraphs above,
contributes to the more general tax interaction effect) Using a different analytical approach, Party obtains
results that conform to those of Bovenberg and de Mooij, showing that the tax interaction effect is of
greater magnitude than the revenue-recycling effect under plausible values for parameters.272'
B. How General Are These Results?
The analytical results from Bovenberg-de Mooij and Party stem from simplified models. What
are thekey simplifying assumptionsof these models, and to what extent axe these simplifications critical
to the results?
1. Intermediate Inputs
Parry terms these the "revenue effectand"interdependency effecL"
"In Party's analysis, the revenue-recycling effect is greater than the tax-interaction effect only when two conditions
simultaneously bold: (I) output from the polluting industry (which produces the good subject to the environmental tax)
is a weaker than avenge substitute for leisure, and (2) the tax elasticity of emissions is well below unity.
Figure 2 shows that to uphold the strong double dividend claim, the magnitude of the revenue-recycling effect must
in fact be larger than that of the tax-interaction effect — by enough to bring the gross costs to zero. In Bovenberg-de
Mooij and Parry'sanalyses,since the tax-interaction effect is larger than the revenue-recycling effect, envtronznernal
taxes not only involve positive gross costs, but larger gross costs than would result from the same tax tn a lint-best
setting where there are no pre-existing taxes and where revenues are returned lump-sum.
12One simplification of the models is that they disregard intermediate inputs. However, in
Bovenberg and Goulder (l994a). the Bovenberg-de Mooij model is extended to incorporate intermediate
inputs, and the results above prevail in the extended model. Bovenberg and Goulder analyze the effects
of environmentally motivatedtaxes on 'dirty" intermediategoods and on "dirty" consumption goods.In
each case, the strong double dividend claim fails to materialize when the uncompensated wage elasticity
of labor supply is positive. The economic basis for the result in the case of the intermediate good tax is
the same as that provided above for the commodity (consumer good) tax. Similar results axe obtained in
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993a).
2. Capital
Another simplification in the above models is their static nature. How would consideration of
capital affect the results? Including capital introduces the possibility that a revenue-neutral environmental
tax could shift the burden of taxation from one factor to another. l'his has efficiency implications to the
extent that, in the initial tax system, the marginal efficiency costs of capital taxation and of labor taxation
are different.29 To assess the importance of including capital in the analysis, two considerations axe
importantFirst,one needs to consider the extent to which the marginal efficiency costs of capital taxation
differ from those oflabor taxationunder the status quo ante. On what do these marginal efficiency costs
dend? While labor taxes distort the labor-leisure margin -- the margin of choice between enjoying
teisure and enjoying consumption (by earning labor income) -- capital taxes distort the intertemporal
margin -- the margin of choice between consuming today and consuming in the future (by saving). For
a given labor tax, the distortion in the labor-leisure margin is greater the larger is the (compensated) wage
elasticity of labor supply. For a given capital income tax, the distortion along the intertemporai dimension
"The discussion here is not formal. To my knowledge, no one has yet examined the double dividend issue
analytically in a dynamic, closed-model with capital and labor. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) develop an
analytical model for a small open economy that employs labor and capital. The efficiency issues I shall discuss here
apply to an economyChatis' large" in the sense that it influences the return to capital; these issues largely absent
in the Bovenberg-van der Ploeg model of a small, open economy, where the return to capital is given by the world
market and the burden of domestically imposed great taxes is fully borne by labor. Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994)
develop a static model with labor and a fixed ftor, capital. The issues I shalt discuss here are only of interest when
capital isnotfixed in supply.
13is greater the larger is thertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. Thus, the relative
marginal efficiency costs of labor and capital income taxes depend on these elasticities and on the
magnitudes of labor and capital income tax rates.
The second consideration is whether the burden or incidence of the environmentaJ tax falls largely
on labor or on capital. As is well known,3° taxes on consumption commodities (such as a consumer
gasoline tax) are implicitly taxes on labor? On the other hand, the burden of taxes on intermediate
inputs (such as a tax on fossil fuels) could potentially fall primarily on capital. This can occur because
such taxes can raise the cost of producing capital goods and thereby lower the rate of return. If this effect
is large enough, the burden of the tax will fall primarily on capital?
These considerations indicate that the gross costs of a revenue-neutral environmental tax will be
lower to the extent that:
(1) in the initial tax system, the difference in marginal efficiency costs (marginal excess burdens) is
large,
(2) the burden of the environmental tax falls primarily on the factor with relatively low marginal
efficiency cost,
(3) the base of the environmental tax is relatively broad, so that the gross distortions it generates in
intermediate good and consumer good markets axe small, and
(4) revenues from the tax alt devoted to reducing tax rates on the factor with relatively high marginal
efficiency cost
These considerations raise the possibility of a zero or negative cost tax swap. For example, if the marginal
excess burden of capital taxes is higher than that for labor, and if the burden of a new environmental tax
falls primarily on labor, then introducing this new tax in combination with a revenue-preserving cut in
30For a general discussion, see AuerbacU and KoUikouf(1987).
'1jj, this phenomenon underlies the Bovenberg-de Mooij result. The environmental (commodity) tax 15 an
implicit labor tax which produces both labor and commodity market distortions.
"Specifically, capital income will fall by a larger percentage than labor income. Labor income falls because the
tax raises costs of production, leading to an increase in the prices of consumer goods and a reduction in the real wage.
14capital taxescan involve zero or negative gross costs.
Wouldthisresult,if it occurred, resuffect the double dividend in its strong form? Or would it
only confirm the intermediate double dividend claim? The issue is semantic: the answer depends on
whether one classifies a (pure) tax on capital as a typical or representative tax. A more clear-cut
confirmation of the strong double dividend notion would occur if the gross costs were negative in a case
where revenues are returned through a general income tax cut (that is, through cuts in the marginal rates
applicable to capital arid labor). Returning the revenues through a general income tax cut "dilutes" the
gain associated with revenue-replacement, because it involves a reduction in the relatively efficient factor
tax as well as the more inefficient one. This method of revenue-replacement does not exploit the potential
contribution of item (4) above; but foregoing (4) enables the policy to test unequivocally the strong
double-dividend claim. The above considerations indicate that if the capital tax is extremely costly relative
to the labor tax, the gross costs can be negative even if the potential contribution of (4) is not exploited.
Thus, once capital is considered, the theory gives more scope for the possibility of the strong
double dividend. Is it likely empirically? Most empirical studies for the U.S. indicate that capital taxes
have higher marginal excess burdens than do labor taxes." Under these circumstances, the prospects for
a strong double dividend become more favorable to the extent that:
(I')in the initial tax system, there is large difference in the marginal excess burden (MEB) per dollar
of revenue for capital taxation, as compared with the MEB per dollar for labor taxation.
(2')the burden of the environmental tax falls primarily on labor, and
(3')the base of the environmental tax is broad.
Are these conditions met in the real world? Cowlition (2') indicates that the strong double
dividend claim could potentially be upheld for an environmentally motivated commodity tax, because such
taxes tend to be borne largely by labor. An example of an environmentally motivated commodity tax is
a tax on consumer purchases of gasoline. In a world where capital taxes have much higher excess burdens
than labor taxes, the gasoline tax (with revenues returned through cuts in income taxes or, even better.
"See Ballard, Shoven, and V/halley (1985), and Jorgenson and Yun (t990).
15thiough cuts in capital taxes) is appealing because it helps shill the burden of taxation from capital to
labor. Intuitively,thisconsumer-leveltax functions likea consumption tax and shares the appeal of a
consumption tax in reducing intertemporal distortions, or distortions in capital markets. On the other hand,
a tax on consumet-s' gasoline purchases is obviously much narrower than a general consumption tax. As
indicated by condition (3'). the narrowness of the base is a liability. To the extent that substitution from
gasoline is easy. a given gasoline tax will generate less revenue and introduce larger gross distortions in
commodity markets, worsening the prospects for zero or negative gross costs?'"
The prospects for the strong claim axe worse in the case of a tax on intermediate inputs. Certain
intermediate input taxes -- for example, a tax on fossil fuel inputs -- may have a strong justification when
environmental benefits are taken into account But the double dividend issue relates only to the cost side,
and intermediate input taxes do not have much promise on this side of the ledger. The reason is that these
taxes are often borne to a significant degree by capital. To the extent that fossil fuels are employed more
intensively in the production of capital goods than in the economy in general, an environmentally
motivated tax on fossil fuels will raise the relative price of these goods and be borne more by capital.
In the data set employed in my general equilibriumenergy-economy-environmentmodel of the U.S. (see
Goulder (1994a]), capital goods production is highly energy intensive. Consequendy. in policy simulations
the burden of fossil fuel (intermediate input) taxes falls primarily on capital, virtually ruling out the
possibility of the double dividend in the strong form.
The new dimension that arises when capital is considered is that of shifting the burden of taxes
between factors and thereby exploiting differences in the marginal excess burdens of factor taxes. This
dimension has force only insofar as the existing tax system is inefficient in the sense that the marginal
3Paradoxically, the very feature - a narrow base - that contributes to larger gross costs is the feature that often
makes environmentai taxes attractive in terms of overall efficiency. The narrower these taxes are, the closer they often
are to the source of the externality (icr example, certain types of emissions). Hence, even though the narrower base
tends to amplify gross costs, it also tends to expand gross benefits and overall efficiency (gross benefits minus gross
costs). To the extent that the objective is overall efficiency, large costs should not stand in the way of
environmental taxes.
3'This implicitly assumes that a uniform commodity tax is optimal (see footnote 23). Optimal commodity tax
principles indicate that, other things equal, there is an efficiency rationale for relatively higher taxes on commodjues
that are highly complementary to leisure. See, for example,Atkinson andStiglitz(1980). chapter12.
16excess burdensofdifferent taxes are not equal. Arguably, the case for reducing these inefficiencies is
independentof thecasefor a new environmental tax.The possibility of adouble dividendinthe strong
form is moredifficult if oneconsiders only situationswherethe "rest of the taxsystem" isoptimal in
some sense. We return tothisissue in Section V.
3. Pre-Existing Subsidies
The issue just raised also is relevant to evaluating the strong double dividend claim in the presence
of prior subsidies: there may be independent reasons for revoking the subsidies. Still, it is worthwhile
noting that prior subsidies clearly offer scope for the strong double dividend. For example, a carbon tax
can serve to undo prior subsidies on fossil fuels and thereby reduce or eliminate the gross distortionary
costs in fuels markets. Shalt and Larsen (1992) emphasize this point in considering the potential for
carbon taxes in developing countries.
4. Emissions Taxes
The analytical models discussed above consider taxes on commodities (consumer goods or
intermediate inputs) whose production or use generates pollution. Other things equal (abstracting from
monitoring costs, etc.), it is most efficient to tax the source of the externality, that is. emissions. Relative
to commodity taxes, emissions taxes can yield higher overall efficiency gains. But the results concerning
the double dividend.aze not changed. One can think of emissions as another intermediate input. As with
taxes imposed on an ordinary intermediate input, emissions taxes alter the mix of all intermediate inputs
and distort factor markets. The same mechanisms as discussed earlier indicate that emissions takes will
involve larger gross costs per dollar of revenue than the income (labor) taxes they replace. Whether they
are more or less attractive in terms of gross costs than intermediate input taxes depends on the production
technology.It may seem cournerintuitive that emissions taxes do not automatically fare beuer than
ordinary input taxes in terms of the double dividend. It helps to keep in mind that the issue here is gross
costsperdollar of revenue, not overall gross costs. The same feature that makes emissions taxes attractive
in termsofoverallefficiency--theirability to induce larger emissions reductions per dollar of revenue
17than ordinary intennediate input taxes -- curtails their attractiveness intermsof grosscosts.
5.Exhaustible Resources and Decreasing Returns
To this point we have only considered axes on produced goods. In assessing the gross costs, we
needed to consider the distortions produced in the markets for the factors that produced these goods. In
particular, in examining the costs of a tax on fossil fuels, we regarded fossil fuels as produced intermediate
goods and attended to the related distortions in the markets for labor and capital.
Of course, fossil fuels in their original form are primary resources, not produced goods. They are
exhaustible resources whose reserves are given by natureY The essentiai scarcity of natural resource
stocks gives rise to scarcity rents. A basic result from the literature on the taxation of natural resources
is that a constant tax on these rents does not alter the intertemporal allocation of these resources and has
no efficiency cost.37 This suggests that an environmentally motivated tax on, say, fossil fuels, might not
have a significant (gross) efficiency cost after all, given the exhaustible nature of these fuels. If this were
the case, then swapping a tax on these fuels for ordinary income taxes might be a negative cost option,
upholding the double dividend claim in its strong form.
Should the previous results be discarded because they derive from models that ignored exhaustible
resources? Not necessarily. It should be recognized that in most cases, the environmentally motivated
taxes under actual consideration are not taxes on scarcity rents. The base of a carbon tax, for example.
is not the scarcity rent but rather the quantity of fuel purchased (since carbon combustion and the amount
of CO2 emitted are functions of the quantity of fuel consumed). In contrast with a tax on pure rent, the
tax on fuel output affects intertemporal choice and introduces a gross efficiency cost.3' Despite the
exhaustible nature of fossil fuels, a carbon tax does not attain the non-distortionasy ideal.
34Knownreserves,of course, are endogenous, a function of exploralion activity. This does not alter the main points
discussed here.
"See,for example. Sweeney (1977,1993),and Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
3This is the case because. in general,thepresent value of the tax payment per unit of fuel is not constant through
time. On this see, for example. Sweeney (1977).
18Of course, thisdoesnot entirely disprove the significance of exhaustibility to the double dividend
issue.Even lithe environmental taxes in question are related to fuel output rather than rent, it is possible
that the gross efficiency costs of these taxes might be considerably lower when these 'outputs' are
extracted exhaustible resources. To continue with the fossil fuels example, extracted fossil fuels are the
productof several primary factorinputs: natural resource stocks (fuels in the ground), capital and labor,
The gross efficiencycost fromtaxesonthese fuels will be a weightedaverage ofthe gross efficiencycost
generated bythetax intheexhaustibleresource market, the capitalmarket,andthelabormarket.39To
discern this efficiencycost,one wouldneedto knowtheextentto whichthe tax is bornebyeach ofthese
lactorsand themarginal efficiency cost associatedwithreductionsinscarcity rents,thereturn to capital,
and the wage. This information is not easy to obtain, to say the leastAscertaining the marginal
efficiencycost in the resource market alone is exceedingly difficult Despite these difficulties; further
empirical work aimed at gauging these magnitudes might be of considerable value.
6.Involuntary Unemployment
The above models assume all markets clear. However, introducing involuntary unemployment
inthe models by way of a fixedreal wage above the market-clearing value would not change the basic
results, assumingno other structuralchanges.In the originalmodels.introducing the (reveriueneutral)
environmentaltax reduces labor productivity and shifts leftward the labor demand function. The same
phenomenon occurs ina model in which the real wage is fixedabovelit originalmarket-clearing level;
the result is higher involuntary unemployment. The gross costs of this revenue-neutral policy arepositive
for the same reasonsasin the market-clearing models. However, the results differ when a further
stnactural change is introduced. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1993a) develop a model with involuntary
unemployment (resulting from a fixed real wage) and three factors of production: labor, resources, and
"Whetherthe strong double dividend arises depends on whether the government has already taxed fixed-factor rents.
Ina modelwith three factors of production — labor,resources,anda fixed factor,Bovenberg andvan der Ploeg (l993a)
show analytically that a tax on a "dirty" consumption commodity failstoyield a double dividend(in thestrong sense)
if alltherents from the fixed Ixtor are already taxed. On the other hand, if fixed factor rents are not taxed, the same
type of tax offers the double dividend. In the latter case the commodity tax proxies for the tax on fixed factor rentL
and enjoysmuch of itsefficiency potential.
19a fixed factor.In thismodel, under some circumstances therevenue-neutralcombination of an
environmentaltax and a labor tax cut boosts employment and raises the non-envizonmentaJ component
of welfare (that is, the gross welfare cost is negative). This occurs when the production share of the fixed
factor is large and substitution between labor and resources is easy. Under these circumstances a large
share of the tax burden 1mm the environmental tax is borne by the fixed factor, with relatively little
efficiency cost. Hence the revenue-preserving cut inthelabortaxyields a gross efficiency gain that more
than offsets the gross efficiency cost attributable to the environmental tax.'°
7. The Environment As a Capital Good
In the analytical models discussed so far, environmental quality, if it is represented at all, enters
as an argument of the utility function. It is a nonrival consumption good. The models that incorporate
environmental quality usually assume that utility from conswnption of "ordinary" goods and services is
separable from utility from environmental quality. This permits a clean separation of gross costs and
environmental benefits in the welfare analysis.
Environmental quality may also function as a capital good. That is, a cleaner environment may
contribute positively to output, holding other inputs constant Accounting for the productive contribution
of environmental quality is a key element in developing truly integrated economy-environment models.
Such integration permits models to capture an important potential benefit from environmental taxes:
namely, the avoidance of the adverse impact of environmental deterioration on production.4'
Once the capital goods aspect of environmental quality is included in an economic model, it
becomes more difficult to separate cleanly the gross costs and (environmental) benefits of tax policies.
'Gross costs" signifies the effect of the environmental tax on welfare, abstracting from welfare changes
°The same qualitative result would obtain if there were no involuntary unemployment in this model, In this model,
the environmental tax serves as an implicit way to tax the rents from the fixed factor in the absence of a mote direct
instrument to do so.
9lis is an important dimension of the environmental benefits from a carbon tax. To the extent that a carbon tax
slows the accumulation of greenhouse gases and reduces global warming, it avoids productivity losses in agriculture and
other climate-sensitive sectors.
20linked to changes in environmental quality.Ina model with environment as a capital good, it is difficult
(though not impossible)to performthis abstraction. In a very recent paper, Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994) develop a model in which environmental quality functions both as a capital good and consumption
good. They show that, under certain circumstances, an environmental tax produces the two "dividends"
of a cleaner environment and faster economic growth. In my view, their result, strictly speaking, does not
provide support for the strong double dividend notion because it involves benefit-side issues; this is not
a case of negative gross costs. Rather, their result supports the notion that when production-related
environmental benefits are taken into account, environmental taxes sometimes can lead to faster growth
as well as a cleaner environment.42
8. Terms or Trade Effects
All of the analyses discussed above adopt a closed-economy framework. In open economies.
another economic dimension -- changes in the terms of trade -- can affect welfare. In certain cases an
open economy can employ environmental taxes as a means of improving its terms of trade. Specifically,
if the economy in question is a net importer of the good on which the environmental tax is imposed, and
if this economy is large enough to exert monopsony power (that is, large enough to influence world prices
of this good). then imposing the environmental tax can improve this enonomy's terms of trade. By taxing
this imported good, this economy reduces national (and thus global) demands for the good and induces
a reduction in good's before-tax price in world markets. This shifts some of the burden of the domestic
environmental tax onto foreigners. assuming that the revenues from the tax are devoted to cuts in taxes
paid by domestic consumers or domestically owned firms, If the terms of trade gains are large enough.
they could offset the other gross costs associated with the domestically imposed environmental tax and
produce the strong double dividend from the point of view of the domestic economy.°
'2Consideraiion of the capital good aspect of environmental quality seems to be very important in the overall benefit-
cost evaluation of environmental tax options and may help justify the replacement of ordinary taxes by environmental
taxes in several instances. But the strength of the case for the strong double dividend claim, as defined here, seems
largely independent of whether the capital good function of environmental quality is accounted for.
°Terms of trade effects do not support the strong double dividend claim in global terms.
21For theU.S.,an environmentally motivated tax on imported oil could fall in thiscategory"On
the other hand, it is difficult to make the case that the U.S. would enjoy teams of trade gains from a
(unilateral) carbon taxbecause this taxapplies largely to coal, of which the U.S. is a net exporter..
C. A Common Theme
A unifying themeemerges fromthese considerations. Although the above analysis reveals
circumstances in which the strong double dividend can occur, with one exception (the teams-of-trade case)
these circumstances involve an essential inefficiency in the existing tax system on non-environmental
dimensions. That is, the strong double dividend can arise only if the initial tax system involves
inefficiencies in the form of differences in the marginal excess burdens of various taxes.If the
environmental tax shifts the tax burden from factors associated with high MED's to factors with relatively
low MED's. it can thereby reduce the non-environmental inefficiencies of the tax system and (if this effect
is large enough) yield the strong double dividend. Thus, the strong double dividend presumes a need.
based on non-environmental considerations, for factor tax reform. It is reasonable to ask why these
inefficiencies cannot be addressed directly (through changes in factor tax rates) rather than through an
environmental tax. It seems more natural to address these inefficiencies directly as part of general tax
reform than indirectly as part of environmental policy.
One qualification to this last remark might be offered: there may be political opposition to
reforms that directly alter the relative taxation of factors. Under these circumstances one could regard a
revenue-neutral environmental tax policy as a more feasible alternative to direct reforms which axe
politically less palatable. The empirical support for this political argument is far from clear. Even if there
were an empirical basis for the argument. or might feel uncomfortable rallying behind it since it
essentially exploits the inability of voters to recognize the true incidence of environmental taxes.
"The analysis is made more complicated by the ex.isLence of the OPEC cartel and the imperftly competitive nature
oftheworld oil market.
22IV. NumericalFindings
Thissection presents some numerical results applicable to the double dividend issue. Here I
consider only the results that bear on the strong double dividend notion defined above: the issue under
investigation is the gross costs (non-environment-related welfare costs) of revenue-neutral tax swaps. As
mentioned earlier (see footnote 7) some other studies define reductions in unemployment or increased
profits as additional 'dividends' from green taxes. I do not report results from these studies here because
I do not have the information necessary to combine the reported changes in unemployment, profits, and
other economic variables into the more general welfare notion expressed by "gross costs."'
Table 1 presents results from five numerical models. These are the Goulder and Jorgenson-
Wilcoxen intertemporal general equilibrium models of the U.S., the DPI and LINK econometric
macroeconomic models of the U.S., and the Shah-Larsen partial equilibrium model, which has been
applied to five countries, including the U.S.'4 The results in Table I are for the revenue-neutral
combination of an environmental tax (usually a carbon tax) and reduction in the personal income tax.
except in cases where this combination was not available. I have focussed on the casewhere revenues
are returned through cuts in the personal income tax because this tax seems "typical" and "representative;'
hence this case is relevant to the strong double dividend claim.
All welfare changes are grosswelfarechanges: they abstract from changes in welfare associated
with improvements in environmental quality (reductions in greenhouse gas emissions), and thus they
correspond to the gross cost concqt discussed above. In the Goulder and Jorgenson-Wilcoxenmodels.
welfare changes are reported in terms of the equivalent variation; in the Shah-Larsen model, the changes
"Nor do I consider the evidence for the weak double dividend notion. As mentioned earlier, there is virtually
unanimous numerical support for this notion, so a weighing this evidence seems unnecessary.
"For a more detailed description of these models. see Goulder (1994a), Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990, 1994).
Shackleton eta!.(1992).and Shah and Larsen (1992).TheShah-Larsen model i byfarthe simplest of the five models.
in part because iL takes pre-tax factor prices as given. Despite its simplicity, the model addresses interactionsbetween
commodity and factor markets and thus incorporates some of the major efficiency connectionsdiscussed earlier.
23are based on the compensating vaiiation.4' In the DRI and LINK macroeconomic models, the percentage
change in aggregaterealconsumption substitutes for a utility-based welfare measure4B
In most cases, the revenue-neutral green tax swap involves a reduction in welfare, that is. entails
positive gross costs. This militatesagainstthe strongdoubledividend claim. Results from the Jorgenson-
Wilcoxen model, however, support the strong double dividend nOtion.49 To what might the differences
in results be attributed?
A thorough examination of the differences in structure of these models, and an extensive test of
how these differences account for differences in model outcomes, is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, one potential explanation lies in the differences between the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen and Goulder
models in the marginal excess burden of capital taxation!0 The interest elasticity of saving is higher in
the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model than in the Goulder model. In addition, the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model
assumes that capital is fully mobile across sectors, while the Goulder model includes adjusunent costs.
which limit the speed ax which capital can be reallocated and lower the elasticity of capital demand. Thus,
elasticities of capital supply and capital demand are higher in the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model;
correspondingly, the marginal excess burden of capital taxation is considerably higher in the Jorgenson-
Wilcoxen model than in the Goulder model, and the difference in the marginal excess burdens of capital
"The equivalent variation is the lump-sum change in wealth which, under the 'busthesns-usual' or base case,
would leave the household as well off as in the policy-change case. Thus a positive equivalent variation indicates that
the policy is welfare-improving.The compensatingvariation is the lump-sum change in wealth which, in the policy-
change scenario, would cause the household to be as well off as in the base case. In reporting the Shah-Larsen results
I adopt the convention of multiplying the compensating variation by -I, so that a positive number in the table signifies
a welfare improvement here as well,
"The demand functions in these models are not derived from an explicit utility function. Hence they do fbI yield
utility-based measures. A difficulty with using consumption as a proxy for weLfare is that it disregards welfare changes
linked to changes in leisure.
01t might also be noted that the Shah-Larsen model yields negative gross costs for four of five countries in
simulations which combine a carbon tax arid reduction in the corporate income tax. (Such results do not appear in Table
I.) Only in the case of the U.S. is such a tax swap a gross-wetfare-reducing venture.
'°Of the five models in Table 1, these two are the most similar and allow for the most straightforward comparisons.
24and of labor is larger.In the Goulder model, the differencein MEWsper dollar is $O.lO;' the
difference in the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model appears to be considerably higher.52 As indicated in the
previous section. a large deviation in the MEB's on capital and labor taxes works in favor of the strong
double dividend (particularly if the burden of the environmental tax falls on labor). This helps explain
why, in the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model, a revenue-neutral combination of carbon tax and reduction in
capitaltaxinvolves negative grosscosts(that is, a positive change in gross welfare). It is more difficult
to account for the fact that substituting a carbon tax for a labor tax involves negative gross costs in the
model.
Table 1 also includes GNP impacts. These are included simply because they may be of interest.
As mentioned above, conceptually they bear no systematic relationship to welfare impacts. Indeed, in
some of the numerical simulations the GNP and welfare changes axe of opposite sign.
Like the theoretical results, the numerical outcomes in Table I tend to weigh against the strong
double dividend claim. But there is less than perfect agreement among the numerical results. Divining
the sources of differences in results across models is difficult and frustrating, in large part because of the
lack of relevant information on simulation outcomes and parameters. Relatively few studies have
performed the type of analysis that exposes the channels underlying the overall impacts. There is a need
for more systematic sensitivity analysis, as well as closer investigations of how structural aspects of tax
policies (type of tax base, nanowness of tax base, uniformity of tax rates, etc.) influence the outcomes.
In addition, key behavioral parameters need to be reported. Serious attention to these issues will help
explain differences in results and, one hopes, lead to a greater consensus on likely policy impacts.
Tbe MEB's per dollar are $0.22 and $0.12 for the tax on individual capital and individual labor income.
respectively.
"Thisassumption isbasedonreported values in Jorgenson and Yun (1990). The Jorgcnson-Yun and Jcrgenson-
Wilcoxenmodelshavesome similarities in structure and parameters, but there are important differences as well.
Marginal excess burden numbers from the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model were not yet available.
25V. Relationship to Optimal Environmental Taxation
A. The Optimai Tax Rate and the Strong Double Dividend Claim
Theprevious discussions concerned the effects of 'incremental tax reforms. How do these issues
relate to the optimal levels of environmental taxes?
The basic partial equilibrium analysis of the optimal environmental tax invokes the "Pigovian"
principle: the optimal environmental tax is at a rate equal to the marginal external costs, or marginal
environmental damages (MEn). This principle implicitly assumes that the gross marginal cost (or
marginal abatement cost) associated with an environmental tax is equal to the tax rate. Hence if the tax
is set equaltoMED. gross costsandenvironmental benefits will be equated at the margin, assuring
optimality.53
The foregoing discussion indicates, however, that in a second-best setting a given environmental
tax may give rise to marginal gross costs that differ from the tax rate. As indicated above, the revenue
replacement effect tends to reduce the gross costs; other things equal, it tends to imply a higher optimal
tax rate, that is. a rate above MED. On the other hand, the tax interaction effect tends to raise gross costs;
other things equal, it implies an optimal raze below MED. A central question underlying the strong notion
of double dividend is whether the revenue replacement effect is strong enough to outweigh the tax
interaction effect. The answer to this question also determines the relationship between the optimal tax
rate and MED in a second-best setting. The previous discussion indicated that, under plausible conditions.
the tax interaction effect is of greater magnitude than the revenue recycling effect. This implies that,
under these conditions, the optimal environmental tax rate is below the raze implied by the Pigovian rule.
This result is supported by analytical work by Bovenberg and van derPloeg (1993b) and by Parry
(1994)!' From Bovenberg and van der Ploeg's analysis, in a second-beg setting the optimal
"Assuming the appropriate second-order conditions apply.
"The seminal conuibution in this area was by Sandmo (1975), who analyzed the optimal configuration of
commodity taxes when one of the commodities generates an extanality.
Pany derives analytically the conditions wider which the tax interaction effect wiil be greater than the revenue
replacementeffect. Conducting broad sensithity analysis, he Finds that under plausible parameter values the Lax
26environmental tax rate. t. is given by:
= MED I p
where p is the marginal cost of public funds." In their model, p exceeds unityifand only if the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supplyispositive. This is precisely the condition that denies the
double dividend in its strong form.
Bovcnberg and van der Ploeg offer the following intuition for their optimal tax formula.
Environmental quality can be viewed as a good which the public sector provides by obtaining public
revenues through the environmental tax. The higher the value of p. the more costly it is to provide
environmental quality. Thus, the higher is p. the lower the optimal amount of environmental quality and
the lower the value of t, other things equal.5'
interaction effect is of greater magnitude. Parry suggests that in the U.S.theoptimal environmental tax rate is
"typically" between 60 and 90 percent of the ?.D.
'tie marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) is the welfare cost of an incremental increase in government spending
financed by taxes. For an explication of this concept and its relationship to the notion of marginal excess burden, see
Ballard and Fullerton (1992). For an analysis of how agvegate activity influences the MCPF, see Ligthart and van der
Ploeg (1994). Brendemoen and Vennenio (1993) develop and assess numerically a broader notion of the MCPF that
includes the environmental benefits from public projects.
The Bovenberg van der Ploeg formula may appear to contradict an optimality requirement articulated by Lee and
Misiolek (1986). In fact, the results are consistent. (For a close examinalion of this issue, see Schob (1994J.) The Lee-
Misiolek requirement for an optimal environmental tax is that the difference between marginal abatement costs and
marginal environmental benefits pa marginal dollar of revenues must equal the marginal excess burden of existing
distortionary taxes. This can be written as:
___-°mr
where C(TE,to) is total abatement cost, B is total environmental benefit, R is revenue, A is the marginal excess burden
of other taxes, and t, and t0 are the rates of the environmental and existing distortionary tax. Note that C is a function
of both; and . If t0 is zero, A is ro and the equation above reduces to:
BC/3t5 c3B/
the Pigovian rule. Let t represent the tax rate that satisfies the above equation. Now consider the case where there
are pre-existing taxes Cr0 > 0). How does ;**, the optimum when other taxes an present, differ from ;? Oates
(1991) points out that the tax elasticity at the Pigovian optimum is relevant here. If the derivative aC/at, were
independent of t,. one could determine from this elasticity whether t," is greater or less than t,. Howevet as
discussed above, higher pre-existing taxes raise the value of 3C/?t, evaluated at a given levels of t,. This means that
in the presence of other taxes, a lower value of; may be required to satisfy the Lee-Misiotek requirement.
27These issues are highlyrelevantto considerationsofthe optimal carbontax.Nordhaus (1993)
calculates the optimal carbon tax in the case where revenues are returned lump sum, and compares that
with the optimal tax when revenues are returned through cuts in distothonaiy taxes. In the former case.
the optimal tax begins at about $5 ixrton,while inthelatter case it begins at $59 per ton! This seems
to contradict the notion. indicated by the optimal tax formula above, that second-best considerations should
reducetheoptimal tax rate. It turns out, however, that although Nordhaus's experimentsattendto the
revenue-replacement effect, they do not capture the tax interaction effect because the model did not
include pie-existing taxes. Including pie-existing taxes in the benchmazt data would likely reverse the
Nordhaus results. In this connection, simulations byBovenbergand Goulder(1994b) indicatethat the
optimal carbon tax declines withtheleveloFpre-existing taxes.
B.Caveats
-
Thesemodelsindicatethat in the presence of other taxes, the optimal environmental tax rate is
lower than MED.Althoughthese results seem intuitive, they are no more compelling than the case against
the strong double dividendidea.Totheextentthatmorncomplexmodelsmightexpand the possibilities
fora strongdouble dividend,they alsooffer scope foran optimalenvironmental taxabove MED.
Itis also important to recognize that the optimal tax formulae byBovenberg-vanderPloegand
Parry assume that the optimal environgnentai tax is part ofanoptimal tax system. These formulae do not
address the constrained second-bestproblem: howbest to establish environmental taxes when the rest of
the tax system is suboptimal. Much depends on how the rest of the system departs fivm optimality.
Simulation experiments by Bovenberg and Goulder (1994b) for the U.S. economy indicate that the
"suboptimality"3' of the U.S. tax system implies a constrained second-best optimal carbon tax which is
lower than that suggested by the Bovenberg-van dec Ploeg formula The intuition is that a given
environmental tax generates a larger gross cost in a suboptimal setting than in a setting where other taxes
axe set optimally.
"The tax system is suboptimal in the sense that marginal gross efficiency costs of different taxes are notequal.
To the extent that the Lax system is meeting other objectives, this need not be suboptimal in a broader sense.
28C. "Is a Small Tax Efficiency-Improving?" and Related Theoretical Issues
The cost-side-oriented discussion of the double dividend is driven by the broaderquestion as to
whether the substitution of environmentally motivated or "green" taxes forordinary taxes might be a
welfare-improving venture. It is important to recognize that the difficulty of substantiating thestrong
double dividend claim is not art indication that green taxswaps are ill-advised. Even if gross costs are
positive, the environmental benefits could outweigh these costs, possibly by a substantialmargin.
But in light of the uncertainties, are positive net benefits likely? There isa line of reasoning that
suggests that policymakers can be assured that benefits will exceed costs provided that the environmental
tax is sufficiently "small." The argument is that the gross costs of an incremental environmental lax(with
revenues devoted to reducing ordinary taxes) is inftnitesmal; in contrast, the gross benefits from an
incremental environmental tax are non-incremental. This argument prompts two questions: (I) Doesa
"small" environmental tax indeed have a "small" gross cost? Arid (2) If so, is this ofpractical value to
poticytnakers?
A result 1mm Bovenberg and de Mooij (1992, 1993) is relevant to the first question. In their
framework, an incremental environmental tax, with revenues returned as a reduced labor tax, indeed has
azero grosscost. When the environmental tax is small, it yields the same labor market distortion as the
labor tax it replaces, and the gross distortion in the commodity market is infinitesmal, Hence the overall
grosscostiszero.Solong as the tax yields anon-incrementalenvironmental benefit, it offersanoverall
welfare improvement50
However, the claim that a small tax yields an overall efficiency improvement may not apply in
more general circumstances such as the case where the initial tax system is highly inefficienL The issue
is an example of the general second-best tax problem investigated by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956),
Bertrand and Vanek (1971), Dixit (1975). and others:In a suboptimal tax system, under what
circumstances does introduction of a tax in one market that helps bring prices closer to marginal cost in
"Asimilarresult appears in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (l993t). The authors begin with a situation where
households have no concern for environmental quality, and the tax system is optimized conditional on those preferences.
They then assume a shift in preferences: the emergence of a concern for environmental quality. It is shown thai. in
this new setting, raising a tax on the 'dirty' commlity improves welfare,
29that market yieldanovcrall efficiency improvement? Although a number of authors have shownparticular
conditionsunder which this will occur (see, for example, Dlxii [1975]), this cannot beguaranteed for tax
systemsthat simultaneously involve labor, capital, and commoditytaxation.These notions are reinforced
byresultsfrom simulations ofa carbon taxbyBoverthergand Goulder(1994b) andbyParry (1994). In
these simulations,an incremental carbon tax has incremental gross costs when the initial tax situation is
efficientinthe sense that marginal excess burdens of taxes are equated.However,the incremental tax
involveslargegross costs when the initial situation reflects inefficiencies of the U.S. tax system.
Thissuggeststhat, in manycases,onecannot be assuredthat a small environmentaltax will
producesmallgrosscosts. Moreover, even ifthis werethe case,theknowledgethatgross costs will be
smallseems to be of limited practical value. In my view,itcannot substituteforinformation about the
magnitudes of environmental benefits. In the extreme case where analysts have virtually no infoimation
about the magnitudes of these benefits --exceptperhaps that they are non-negative —onecannot tell how
small is small enough. No matter how small the tax, it's possible that the (small)gross costs exceed the
(even smaller) gross benefits. Although it is useful to know that incremental taxes producenegligible
costs,to beof practical value this knowledge needs to be coupled with information about benefits.
This discussion was not meant to lead to pessimism. Rather, it was intendedtoserve the
constnjctivepurposeofdrawing attention tosignificant issues in policyevaluation.The key implication
ofthisdiscussion is that in evaluating possiblegreentax swaps, information about environmentalbenefits
is indispensable, Much of the interest in the possibility of a doubledividendwas fueled by a hope that
benefits considerations could be pushed aside. This seems to have been a false hope. The benefits side
is critical, and further research to reduce the uncertainties about environmental benefits islikely to be of
great value to policy analysts.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has articulated different senses of the potential "double dividend' from environmental
taxes and examined the theoretical and empirical support for each.
30The weakest double dividend claim is that returning tax revenues through cuts indistortionary
taxes leads to cost savings relative to the case where revenues are returned lump sum. This claim is easily
defended on theoretical grounds and (thankfully) receives wide support from numerical simulations
The stronger versions contend that the costs of revenue-neutral swaps of environmental taxes for
ordinary distorlionazy taxes involve zero or negative gross costs. The strongest version affIrms that this
istypically thecase.Anintermediate versionassertsthat this is the case in at least one instance. The
existing theoretical analyses of this issue cast doubt on the strong double dividend claim. At the same
time, the theoretical case against the strong form is not air-tight. In simple models the strong version
would obtain if the uncornpensated wage elasticity of labor supply were negative. In more elaborate
models, it could arise if the initial tax system were highly inefficient in factor markets (leading to
significant differences across factors in marginal value products per dollar) and the environmental tax
served to shift the burden of taxes to more efficient (actors. These inefficiencies may offer more of a
justification For direct attention to these inefficiencies than for indirect approaches through a revenue-
neutral environmental tax.
Although the evidence is mixed, numerical results tend to militate against the strong double
dividend claim. There is a need for more systematic numerical investigations of revenue-neutral
environmentally motivated tax policies. More extensive policy analyses and broader sensitivity analyses
would help identify the channels driving the results and reveal the sources of differences in model
outcomes. The extent to which the burden of environmentally motivated taxes is imposed on exhaustible
resources (and on resource rents) remains a very interesting empirical issue, and greater attention to this
issue in numerical models could generate important insights.
The difficulty of establishing the strong double dividend does not contradict the common
numerical finding that an environmental tax can promote higher levels of national income when revenues
are earmarked for capital formation. National income is distinct ftom welfare, and the double dividend
notions (at least as defined here) concern welfare costs.
The presence or absence of a strong double dividend is directly relevant to the issue of the optimal
environmental tax. In simpler models, the conditions under which the strong double dividend claim is
31absent (present) are closely related to the conditions under which the second-best optimal environmental
tax is lower than (greaterthan)the marginal environmental damages. Existing analytical models, in
casting doubt on the strongest double dividend claim, also indicate that the optimal environmental tax is
lowerthanthe rate suggested by the simple Pigovian rule.
The keen interest in the double dividend -- particularly in its strong ftnm -- reflects the
uncertainties faced by policymakers concerning environmental benefits. The strong double dividend
notion, if true, would reduce significantly the amount of information that policymakers need to make a
benefit-cost case for green tax swaps. The difficulty of establishing the strong claim implies.
unfortunately, that assessing magnitudes of environmental benefits remains a crucial task in policy
evaluation. This conclusion cannot be dodged by appeals to the net benefits from "small" environmental
taxes. One never knows a priori how small is small enough, and, moreover, even small environmental
taxes may have "large" gross costs when the existing tax system is suboptimal (in some sense).
The critical importance of attending to the environmental benefits may the most fundamental
message from this examination. Reseaich that helps establish the environmental benefits associated with
various environmental tax options will have considerable value to policy analysts. While reseaxth can
reduce the uncertainties, they will remain a basic fact of life in environmental policymaking. Policymakers
cannot afford to wait until circumstances permit riskless policy choices; they would wait forever. A better
approach is to recognize the uncertainties and endorse environmental tax reforms when the prospects for
gain make the risks worth taking.
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